comes the dominant outcome experienced, no matter how situationally appropriate, it undermines psychological health and well-being. It therefore warrants being labeled a negative psychological characteristic. A similar analysis can be made for each of Erikson’s psychosocial stage components.

McNulty and Fincham (2012) did not set up bipolar continua for the four ostensibly positive processes they discussed. I suggest the following: The opposite pole to forgiveness would appear to be continuing anger and resentment. The opposite pole to optimistic expectations is pessimistic expectations. They promote greater psychological health or unbeneficent attributions is negative thoughts or unsympathetic attributions. The opposite pole to kindness would appear to be meanness. In each instance, the former pole is syntonic, the latter dystonic. As with the analysis of Eriksonian stage components, there are some contexts in which the syntonic process is adaptive in promoting well-being and others in which it may prove maladaptive. Correspondingly, there are some contexts in which the dystonic process is most adaptive and in which to act otherwise would decrease well-being. However, viewed across time and contexts, the proportionally greater expression of forgiveness, optimistic expectations, positive thoughts, and kindness, in situationally appropriate ways, rather than their alternatives, will almost certainly promote greater psychological health and overall well-being. This warrants viewing each of these psychological processes as both contextually dependent and positive contributors to achieving well-being. Proportionally greater expression of anger and resentment, pessimistic expectations, negative thoughts, and meanness, no matter how situationally appropriate, appears a poor basis indeed for making claims with respect to well-being. A similar analysis should be applied to each of the psychological traits and processes positive psychologists have identified as being elements of psychological health or illness.

McNulty and Fincham (2012) noted that many positive psychologists advance the view that psychological research on positive traits and processes should inform our efforts at therapy and prevention. They expressed the concern that endeavors to promote positive qualities for people experiencing suboptimal circumstances may not only fail but may cause harm. In this regard, I believe they misconstrue the objectives of positive psychologists engaged in therapy and prevention. The goal is not to promote positive qualities irrespective of context. Rather, it is to promote the development and expression of positive psychological traits and processes in those contexts where they would be situationally appropriate and/or to help clients change their situations such that the use of negative psychological traits and processes is no longer necessary. We cannot promote such outcomes unless we can identify, and are willing to label, those ways of psychological functioning that are most healthy and associated with well-being and those that are not.

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Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to Alan S. Waterman, P.O. Box 105, Roxbury, VT 05669. E-mail: water@tcnj.edu

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The Pitfalls of Valenced Labels and the Benefits of Properly Calibrated Psychological Flexibility

James K. McNulty and Frank D. Fincham
Florida State University

The Contextual Nature of Psychological Processes

There appears to be consistent support for our position (McNulty & Fincham, February–March 2012) that the implications of any particular psychological characteristic for well-being depend on the context in which they operate. Specifically, Lyubomirska (2012, this issue, p. 574) stated, “McNulty and Fincham (February–March 2012) offered compelling evidence that constructs such as forgiveness and optimism can have both beneficial and adverse consequences, depending on the context.” Likewise, Riva (2012, this issue, p. 574) stated, “In general, I agree with the two authors on the need for a ‘situated’ positive psychology that is able to address the context in which we spend our lives.” Finally, Waterman (2012, this issue, p. 575) stated, “McNulty and Fincham (February–March 2012) provided a service to the field of positive psychology through reminding us that whether psychological traits and processes yield positive or negative outcomes is a function of the interpersonal and cultural contexts in which they are expressed.”

Valenced Labels

Despite this consensus, however, there is mixed support for our position that we need to move beyond positive psychology by avoiding the “positive” and “negative” labels of psychological constructs that have been thrust upon us by the positive psychology movement. In particular, Lyubomirsky (2012) stated that our “caution about labeling particular psychological processes as ‘positive’ is timely and well-taken” and points out that a number of positive psychologists share our view that psychological constructs are not inherently positive. Waterman (2012), in contrast, defended the use of such labels by describing the theoretical notions put forth by Erikson (1963, 1982).

According to Waterman (2012), Erikson argued that whether particular processes, such as trust, are associated with well-being or harm depends on the situation in which they operate. Waterman’s example of a tourist’s tendencies toward trust or mistrust is a helpful one in this respect. In an unsafe context, such as an area of town frequented by thieves, trust is not adaptive. In a safe context, however, trust is adaptive because it feels good and can lead to cooperation and successful interpersonal relations. This conceptualization is perfectly in line with the perspective we described in our original article.

However, Waterman (2012) went on to argue that this conceptualization of psychological constructs suggests that trust and other psychological processes, such as the ones we described in our original article, should be called “positive” because Erikson believed people experience the most well-being to the extent that they express these characteristics more often than they do not. But this is only true for people who spend more time in safe contexts than in unsafe contexts. If the tourist in Waterman’s example spends most of her time in a safe neighborhood and only occasionally passes through unsafe neighborhoods, she will experience well-being to the extent that she trusts more than she does not. But what if she spends most of her time in unsafe neighborhoods?

This observation alerts us to an important problem—many ideas generated by positive psychologists have food and shelter, presumably live in the comfort of safe neighborhoods, and do not live in war-ravaged regions or face tyrannical...
governments. Accordingly, processes such as trust, optimism, forgiveness, kindness, gratitude, and benevolent attributions seem adaptive to them. But a substantial minority of the world population lives in unsafe regions that are stricken by poverty, does not have food or shelter, and does live in war-ravaged regions and/or face tyrannical governments. It is possible that these people will benefit from thinking more negatively and being mistrustful, pessimistic, and unforgiving more often than not.

Properly Calibrated Psychological Flexibility

Are there any psychological processes that are universally beneficial? Perhaps—if construed at a sufficiently abstract level. In his classic article on the nature of scientific inquiry, Schlenker (1974, p. 2) stated,

One of the necessary conditions for the formulation of universal theories and laws, whether in the natural or social sciences, is that they be phrased in sufficiently abstract form as to allow for (a) the insertion of specific objects, cases, places, events, and times as variables and/or (b) the deduction and explanation of specifics from higher-order and more abstract theoretical principles. If a theory incorporates specifics, it would not possess the generality to satisfactorily explain the required diversity of phenomena.

In line with this reasoning, it is inaccurate to state that forgiveness, or any other specific psychological construct, is “positive” because the implications of such processes depend on situations, culture, and time. To be accurate, any universal theory of well-being needs to be abstract enough to adequately account for these nuances.

In search of such a theory, we introduce the idea of properly calibrated psychological flexibility—the ability to employ the most adaptive cognitive or behavioral process in a given situation. Taken together, the contextualized nature of psychological processes described in our original article and the fact that people encounter different situations throughout their lives mean that achieving well-being requires (a) the ability to know which psychological strategy will be most adaptive in any given situation and (b) the cognitive and behavioral flexibility to employ that strategy.

Consider, once again, our tourist. It is unlikely that any person will only encounter situations in which it is appropriate to trust. It is also unlikely that any person will only encounter situations when it is appropriate not to trust. Rather, everyone experiences situations when it is appropriate to trust, and everyone experiences situations when it is appropriate not to trust. Those who always trust will sometimes be successful and will sometimes not be successful. Likewise, those who never trust will sometimes be successful and will sometimes not be successful. But those who flexibly trust in some situations and mistrust in others will be most successful, provided that they properly calibrate their trust and mistrust such that each is employed in the situation for which it is most appropriate.

Such an approach to understanding well-being is abstract enough to apply across (a) psychological constructs, such as trust, forgiveness, optimism, kindness, and benevolent thinking; (b) situations; (c) cultures; and (d) time. Further, it is testable. Consider the McNulty (2008) finding described in our original article. Newlywed spouses with partners who rarely engaged in transgressions remained more satisfied over time to the extent that they were more likely to forgive those partners, whereas spouses with partners who frequently engaged in transgressions remained more satisfied over time to the extent that they were less likely to forgive those partners. Yet, even the same partner may engage in some transgressions with little frequency and other transgressions with more frequency. Accordingly, people may remain the most satisfied to the extent that they are quick to forgive their partners’ occasional transgressions and less likely to forgive their partners’ more-frequent transgressions. Research to test this possibility could obtain within-person estimates of people’s tendencies to forgive their partners’ various transgressions, the frequency with which those partners engage in those transgressions, and people’s satisfaction with their relationships with those partners over time.

Finally, properly calibrated psychological flexibility is teachable. Most current approaches to prevention and treatment teach one set of skills to be used across situations. Challenging the logic of this approach, our analysis suggests that the same skill is not adaptive across situations. The best interventions to promote well-being may thus be those that teach people different skills, forgiveness and unforgiveness, for example, and the best time and place to use each one.

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Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to James K. McNulty, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, 1107 West Call Street, Tallahassee, FL 32306. E-mail: mcnulty@psy.fsu.edu